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Terry L. Miethe, ed. Did Jesus Rise From the Dead? The Resurrection Debate (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1987).  
 
Donald Wayne Viney 
Pittsburg State University 
 
 
 This book could be dismissed as a mere anachronism were it not for the high caliber of its 
contributors. Based on a 1985 public debate between Gary R. Habermas (Apologetics and 
Philosophy, Liberty Baptist University) and Antony G. N. Flew (Professor Emeritus, Kiele 
University), participants argue the merits of the historical evidence that Jesus rose from the dead. 
The debate is followed by a discussion among Flew, Habermas, Miethe, and W. White Beck 
(both of Liberty), and responses by Wolfhart Pannenberg (Professor of Systematic Theology, 
University of Munich), Charles Hartshorne (Ashbel Smith Professor of Philosophy, University of 
Texas), and James I. Packer (Professor of Historical and Systematic Theology, Regent College, 
Vancouver). A closing chapter details Habermas’s replies to Pannenberg, Hartshorne, and 
Packer. 
 
 Flew is well-known in philosophical circles. In addition, he is the [393] favorite whipping 
boy of theists, having often publicly debated Christian philosophers. So notorious is his 
reputation that Daniel Dennett’s humorous Philosophical Lexicon defines a “flew” as “an old-
fashioned device for blowing smoke into churches.” Organizers of the debate could not have 
chosen a more visible or colorful spokesperson to represent the skeptic’s side. However, one 
comes away from this book wishing that Flew had shown more familiarity with current 
scholarship concerning the resurrection. At every turn, Habermas shows that he has done his 
homework, while Flew cites no serious scholarship done within the past century. Despite this 
deficiency, Flew’s arguments are not without merit. 
 
 Flew suspends his earlier view that miracles are “strictly self-contradictory” (God and 
Philosophy, Delta, 1966, p. 149) and makes no a priori restrictions against miracles (63). His 
argument rests, rather, with what he takes to be a lack of reliable evidence for the resurrection. 
The Gospels, for instance, are too far removed from the events they describe to be of much use 
as historical records. Moreover, they are second-hand testimony and contain numerous 
contradictions. Paul’s testimony (particularly I Cor. 15:3-8—the earliest source for the 
resurrection) is equally unreliable. Paul fails to mention the details that figure prominently in the 
Gospels, such as the empty tomb and the apparently physical nature of Jesus’ resurrection body. 
As grounds for believing in the miraculous, these are inadequate. This is not because of any 
prejudice against the paranormal (cf. Miethe’s comments and Flew’s reply, 111). It is simply that 
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greater evidence is needed to establish what we normally believe is impossible than what is 
within the normal course of events.  
 
 Habermas, author of three books on the resurrection and co-author of a book on the 
Shroud of Turin, bases his case on Paul’s testimony and thereby sidesteps Flew’s critique of the 
Gospels. The Shroud is mentioned but is peripheral to the argument. This is just as well since 
recent carbon-dating tests have conclusively disproved the Shroud’s authenticity (cf. Flew’s 
remark 118; Time Oct. 24, 1988, 81). Habermas makes the dubious claim that the Pauline 
evidence is as good as eyewitness testimony (p. 83; Flew’s response 114), but his argument does 
not stand or fall with this claim. The basic argument is that the resurrection is the theory which 
best fits the events acknowledged as historical by most scholars. These events are Jesus’ death by 
crucifixion, the disciple’s claim to have seen the risen Christ, the transformation of the disciples 
into men willing to die for their faith, and Paul’s conversion. While Habermas correctly [394] 
notes the failure of any naturalistic hypothesis accounting for these facts to gain scholarly 
support (21), he concludes that the resurrection is, in all probability, true.  
 
 What is curious is how Habermas could be well informed about the facts of scholarship 
and draw the wrong conclusion. Assuming for the sake of argument that the resurrection 
hypothesis better fits the known facts than any currently available naturalistic account, it does 
not follow that we have good reason to believe in the resurrection. There may be better reason to 
remain agnostic or noncommitted than to believe in the resurrection. Pannenberg claims (128-
129) and Habermas agrees (155) that “it becomes logically impossible to suspend judgment” 
about the Easter tradition if one wishes to offer a reconstruction of how the disciples came to 
hold their beliefs in the risen Christ. While true, it is a non sequitur since the question is whether 
we have better reason to remain agnostic than to believe in the resurrection theory. The question 
of agnosticism is especially relevant in cases that involve claims to the miraculous. As already 
noted, such claims require a higher quality of evidence than run-of-the-mill historical events. 
 
 Of the three commentators, only Pannenberg has much of value to say concerning the 
actual content of the debate. Hartshorne touches on larger metaphysical issues concerning God’s 
existence and human immortality. Packer chastises Flew, praises Habermas, and succumbs to 
hyperbole—“there is more of prejudice and credulity involved in rejecting Christian beliefs than 
in accepting them . . .” (150). Pannenberg sides with Habermas with the qualification that the 
case for the resurrection requires more than Habermas’s four historical facts. He fudges, 
however, on the central issue of whether there is strong enough evidence for the resurrection to 
override the common experience that dead persons do not leave their graves. The answer, he 





 A point that none of the participants or commentators notice is that the physical 
resurrection of Jesus requires the ascension. As C. S. Lewis says, “a phantom can just fade away; 
but an objective entity must go somewhere—something must happen to it” (Miracles, 
Macmillan, 1947, 154). The Lukan answer to Lewis’s observation is that Jesus ascended into a 
cloud and will one day return in a similar fashion (Acts 1:9-11). Now, the ascension, however 
one conceives it, is as miraculous as the resurrection. Thus, it is necessary to explain [395] the 
logical consequences of one miracle by means of another miracle. Habermas chides those who 
affirms the resurrection but do not affirm the logical consequences that proceed from it (176). 
One doubts that even Habermas would argue that there is good historical evidence for the 
ascension. 
 
 
